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Abstract 
The entrepreneurs business is not only businesss, but to persuade the banker to lend him money, to 
persuade the employees to be motivated to do any innovative new project, and to persuade the 
custormers to buy it. Without this entreprenuerial rhetorics no business will succeed. From this point of 
view the entrepreneur is as well an artist as a businessman.  
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurs are a very particular species. Undertakings are risky. That may seem trivial, but only few 
people actually dare to invest in a risky and uncertain future. Entrepreneurs do invest in such futures; 
investments are risky sui generis. Entrepreneurs are atypical decision makers, and therefore they are a 
minority. 
The grand narratives about entrepreneurs and their crucial role in the development of European and 
North Atlantic capitalism we find in Weber, Sombart and Schumpeter (cf. Immerthal, 2007), the 
curiously unimportant part they play in economic theory (cf. Röpke, 2002), their rediscovery at the turn 
of the 21st century (entrepreneurship), and the social expansion of the notion of “entrepreneurship” 
beyond the traditional figure of the entrepreneur (Bröckling, 2007; Priddat, 2011) obscure the fact that 
every investment implies taking a risk most people are unable to deal with socially. Whether 
entrepreneurs act innovatively or according to different rules (as explained by Schumpeter), the 
investment is already an entrepreneurial event: a particular social form of dealing with risk and 
uncertainty (regarding the introduction of uncertainty into the modern world, cf. the first chapters of 
Esposito, 2007). The innovative entrepreneur, who notoriously acts as an investor, is then additionally 
characterized by daring to create something new in uncertain situations, i.e., to operate under 
conditions of insecurity. This is what makes him special, what makes him a non-conformist. Innovators 
are atypical economic and social actors. 
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2. Between Discovery and Creation: The Entrepreneurial Opportunity 
In the specialist field or sub-discipline of entrepreneurship, for example, two fundamental concepts 
confront each other, the traditional theory of discovery (Shane & Venkataram, 2000) and the theory of 
creation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007), which both very clearly follow diametrically opposed 
epistemological assumptions. Depending on the chosen theoretical conception, differing answers are 
given to the question whether and why entrepreneurial opportunities arise and what form, therefore, the 
process between the business idea and its economic exploitation may take. Corresponding 
descriptions—depending on the conceptual orientation—fundamentally affect the characterization of 
the entrepreneurial modes of action of the entrepreneur and provide insights as to how innovation takes 
its systematic place in economic theory. 
In the case of discovery theory, the entrepreneur is, naturally, specified as the discoverer of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity. This is considered feasible because according to the presupposed 
fundamental logic entrepreneurial opportunities exist as real objective phenomena and are, therefore, 
something given that is, in principle, accessible to and exploitable by everybody (Shane & Venkataram, 
2000, p. 220). The opportunities exist independently of the entrepreneur; they are exogenous 
phenomena of “the” economic reality. Consequently, it is the activity of discovery which separates the 
entrepreneurs from others and makes them special. It is relatively clear that this idea is informed by the 
epistemically realist conception that there is something given independently of its observation, which 
can, however, still be seized in an exact and objective way (Rüegg-Stürm, 2003, p. 21). Entrepreneurs 
discover the opening for the business opportunity. They are—optimally informed and of ideal 
character—more successful than others in recognizing and exploiting the opportunity. Due to the 
objectivity of the situation, all the imaginable consequences and results of a decision and also the 
probabilities of their occurrence are known at the point in time of decision-making (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007, p. 17). Uncertainty in the proper sense does not exist for the entrepreneur as an epistemic subject 
because the sequences of events can be exactly calculated mathematically and therefore foreseen. 
Owing to copy theories of cognitive representation contingencies or “potential surprises” á la Knight 
(1921) can be excluded because the knowledge of the pre-existing reality is simply too good. This view, 
consequently, supports the instrumentalist-functionalist approach to entrepreneurial action expressed, 
for instance, by the idea of the strategic planning of a deterministically occurring and therefore 
controllable future, an idea which can be found in other sub-disciplines of the economic sciences. 
In comparison with the idea of discovery, creation theory rests on a contrary epistemological 
constellation of founding notions. Entrepreneurial opportunities exist only ex post, i.e., when they have 
been created by an entrepreneur as their more or less creative maker. Inventing or bringing forth means 
here that something is created or developed in the process of observation itself. Only the observing 
agents are responsible for it (Rüegg-Stürm, 2003, p. 21f.). Thus the entrepreneur is assigned the 
innovative role in the process of winning business opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 336). From 
a perspective characterized as constructivist, entrepreneurial opportunities are created by the 
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entrepreneurs, not least through their social interactions with other agents in a market; they are 
endogenous events (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, p. 15). Entrepreneurs are responsible for the emergence 
of new things because of their, amongst other things, interpretative accomplishments and their 
interpretative competences. Their conditions of action are not in any way simplified by total 
information or secure prognostications of the possible yields of an entrepreneurial opportunity. Even 
the probability of its occurrence is not known at the start of the entrepreneurial action process or cannot 
simply be inferred. Consequently, the entrepreneur makes all entrepreneurial decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty (Grichnik et al., 2010, p. 68f.). An essential aspect of the entrepreneurial strategy is the 
cognitive flexibility in handling the contingences of an uncertain future in order to attain viability for 
the economic projects, and not the adaptation to a pre-given economic reality. This is far from an 
adaptationist, plan-dominated attitude of perfect control, it is much rather context control (Hejl & Stahl, 
2000). Both theory options are summarily characterized by Grichnik et al. (2010, p. 72): “In the real 
world there are entrepreneurial opportunities which are discovered, and there are others which are 
created by the activity of the entrepreneurs and their social environment”. The general goal certainly is 
the development of action-governing expectations and the genesis of action opportunities. But is it 
really a good explanation of entrepreneurship? 
 
3. Another Approach: Innovation as Persuasion 
Let us distinguish the common investor, who takes risks with regard to the expected revenues, and the 
innovative entrepreneur, who must additionally deal with the uncertainty that his new product might 
not be bought at all. Potentially, he could fail. 
Results are unpredictable whenever one does not know the probability of their occurrence. In order to 
work with probabilities, one must be able to assume that the alternatives are valid, i.e., that the offer 
generated by one’s investment will somehow be acceptable. One does not know to what extent, 
however, and that is what we call risk. But if one has no way of knowing whether the imagined 
alternatives are valid at all, one is not dealing with a risky situation, but with uncertainty (a distinction 
by Frank Knight, 1921; also cf. Shackle, 1972). In other words: one cannot know what will happen in 
the future. Uncertain events have the probability = 0, for one does not know if they will ever occur, but 
they have the possibility = 1. Therefore one cannot attribute a probability of occurrence to a potential 
event. Under conditions of uncertainty we are dealing with improbabilities, with possible events that 
remain contingent, that do not necessarily occur. This is the world of innovative entrepreneurs. 
And it is a pessimistic world indeed, as entrepreneurial investors who want to assess their future 
revenues have no way of knowing whether there will be any revenues at all. Yet they ignore that 
possibility, for if they assumed the expected event will not occur they could not focus their 
entrepreneurial energy. Therefore they reduce uncertainty to mere riskiness; this way they try to posit 
the attainability of their goals. When they map out a scenario to simulate different revenue possibilities, 
they estimate the probabilities of the respective events at values (e.g., 0.2 = 20%/0.8 = 80%) that must 
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add up to a total of 1. If they act in this way (as economics advises them to), they work with the fiction 
that the events they expect will indeed occur and only have different probabilities. They aim to 
transform uncertainty to risk. To the extent that they exclude the possible impossibility of an event, they 
are acting unrealistically, but are also being pragmatically optimistic. They accept the lack of certain 
knowledge and develop techniques to deal with their ignorance (Taleb, 2007, p. 25). 
This transposition from uncertainty to risk is not trivial. Entrepreneurs define future success through 
their (investment) decisions; not because they have a special knowledge about future events, but 
because they want to exclude the possibility for what they want not to happen. This is not about 
prognostics or predicting (cf. Beck, 2009), but about construction: about the creation of future in the 
sense of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Or, to be more precise: about imaginative simulation with 
self-persuasive significance. 
With their investment entrepreneurs make decisions about future revenues in the present. That, too, 
appears to be trivial. But as we systematically have no knowledge about the future, investment 
decisions are never trivial. They are characterized by imaginative or expressive rationality (Heap, 
Hollis, Lyons, Sudgen, & Weale, 1997, p. 21ff.). There are no alternative futures (they are not invisibly 
buried in the field of fate), only present decisions about what future alternatives shall be expected. 
Investment decisions anticipate expectations about possible futures, but these expected futures remain 
singular and private for the moment: a mere fiction, a figment of the investor’s imagination. 
Peter Sloterdijk distinguishes the erotics of desire (the modern consumer) from the thymotic impulse, 
the craving for appreciation and self-respect (Sloterdijk, 2006, p. 50). This implies the very same 
heroism Swatch manufacturer Nicolas Hayek calls the entrepreneur’s profession (Hayek, 2005; in the 
context of Sloterdijk Wiedinger, 2013, p. 56). “Peter Sloterdijk set out to understand that rage and sees 
our society’s dominating images of humanity and their economic self as too strongly determined by the 
libidinous energy of wanting-to-have. In contrast, the “thymotic fluidum” of pride and the expansive 
energy of wanting-to-do, of making possible the possibly impossible, fall behind. (…) “only operations 
engaged in future” open up and realize a creative perspective” (Enkelmann, 2013, p. 57f.; referring to 
Sloterdijk, 2006). Entrepreneurial action is not determined by incentive compensation but by the 
“excessive rage” to create something new against all odds. The entrepreneur engaging in innovation 
does not know whether it will be “worth it”, but he makes every necessary effort to create something 
new. This is a different attitude towards the world than the one known from the principle of retributive 
exchange (Enkelmann, 2013, p. 58). This is why the innovative entrepreneur cannot be understood 
within the balancing mechanics of economics: he creates excess. 
Investment decisions must be made now, in the present. Payouts are not taken into account as future 
possibilities, however, but as realizations of a different present (present 2). Of course the future payouts 
are merely possible ones now. Yet the investor/decision-maker does not treat them as possible, but as 
already real. If he did not see it this way, he would not make a decision. He decides on “realities”, i.e., 
on possibilities that must necessarily be realized. 
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In the moment he makes a decision, in his decidedness, there is no uncertainty for him. The façon de 
parler according to which he reduces uncertainty to risk is therefore subjectively wrong as regards the 
entrepreneurial attitude: he reduces uncertainty to entrepreneurial certainty. 
We must distinguish our usual logics of time from the cognitive disposition taken on by the investor. Of 
course he imagines the future returns on investments, but in a different mode: he does not imagine them 
as an imaginary, possible possibility, but as realities. As merely possible payouts they would be too 
noncommittal for him. In his decision, i.e., his investment he binds himself to realization. This 
perspective alone unleashes the energies necessary for the actual realization. Neither the necessary time 
nor the possibility of failure can be eliminated, but this is not how the investor sees it: to him, present 2 
is already real in present 1. We are dealing with a kind of temporal cross-fading here: what is to come is 
believed to be already visible. Accepting this paradox is inevitable for the business of investing: 
basically, the investor does not care about the future. What he wants is realization, present visualization, 
only with a small time lag. This is what determines his actions, for the decision alone does not suffice. 
Any available energy must now be focused on his work, on assessing situations, on other people’s 
convictions, etc. He is embarked on a voluntaristic momentum. The entrepreneur’s decision imagining 
a possibility to be real generates the emergence of the action necessary to actually realize what he 
wants. 
“The entrepreneur pretends the existence of the imagined new combinations in the future and structures 
his present behavior on the basis of the pretensions. Schumpeter insists that innovation is incompatible 
with the calculative behavior assumed by economics theory because innovations canntot be rationally 
deduced from existing knowlegde. Instead the contingent imaginaries of actors motivate und guide the 
inherently incalculabe activity” (Beckert, 2011, p. 18f.). 
“Present visualization” is no blind paralogism (all temporal conditions remain evident), but a conscious 
ignoring of failure as an abductive certainty (following Peirce’s description of abduction in his logics 
of discovery: positing an hypothesis and subsequently confirming it by searching proof by all available 
means; or, in the case of the entrepreneur, searching and executing the right actions necessary for the 
desired realization). He already sees the reality of that in which he decides to invest, in order to 
therefore do his utmost to realize it. His actions are motivated by the anticipated present (present 2 in 
present 1). 
With Shackle we distinguish between possibility and probability (Shackle, 1972, p. 14ff.). Probable 
events can be expected, although they have different probabilities of occurrence (= specific 
probabilities of a present future). Possibilities are defined by the “potential degree of surprise” 
associated with a scenario (e.g., an expected event does not occur, or a wholly different one occurs 
instead (= unknown possibilities of the future present)). The “future present” is unavailable; the 
“present future” is being decided at any given moment. 
What is decisive in such decisions is the firm belief that this and no other future will come to pass (= 
fictionalization as present 2) which is necessary to draw a conclusion for present actions: namely the 
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conclusion to direct all of them towards the realization of this fiction. He who has made the decision 
that this and no other investment will bear fruit in the future, will do everything to make this fiction 
come true. Working with probabilities is useful under these conditions, for it means operating with a 
present future. It comes down to presently designing a future in a way that seems realizable. That the 
present futures might turn out differently is irrelevant to the entrepreneurial creative will (as will). The 
entrepreneur has to muster this will (to be successful, but also to possibly fail). 
This pragmatic embedding of imagination is what distinguishes the entrepreneur from the idealist. He 
does not only have an idea, but also visualizes its realization (“Knowledge is sleep. Realization is 
power”, says the entrepreneur Reinhold Würth, quoted in: Loehr, 2010, p. 44). This mobilization (the 
demonstration of imagination and energy, the unfolding of his field of influence) lets him convince 
others; investors at first, who entrust him with their money to profit from future payouts, then potential 
buyers. 
Entrepreneurs aren’t realists (the possible reality of the futures is fictional in the present), but realizers: 
they create realities by pragmatically acting on their imagination and do all they can do to make their 
idea come true. They are pragmatic idealists. They are idealists, because they follow an idea. They are 
pragmatic, because they aim to realize this idea pragmatically, because they do their utmost to give it 
firm roots in reality. Afterwards, when they have proven successful, they will have always known their 
imagined reality would eventually come true. Those who fail no longer talk about it (They are already 
busy with a new realization. This may well be a reason no one talks about failure: it takes up the energy 
necessary for a pragmatic approach to the next project; this is the euphoristic core of modern 
economics). 
Isn’t this mere voluntarism, however? Entrepreneurs act in a market context. “When they have to make 
a decision, Shackle holds, actors do not begin by making a list of possible scenarios and ascribing 
specific probabilities to them. They refer to data they can “base a hope on”; data grounded in 
assumptions and “reasoned imagination”. Markets do not (only) spread given information, they also 
generate new information through the mutual observation of the observers. (…) This, however, is 
precisely the function we attributed to the probability fiction: it is not there to describe the world, but 
allows us to observe how others observe the world. The question then becomes how to interpret this 
observation” (Esposito, 2007, p. 91; referring to Shackle, 1972, p. 96). Alongside the innovative 
entrepreneurs’ voluntarism and enthusiasm, what we have here is a pragmatic strategy of continuously 
observing other entrepreneurs to find out what ventures they prepare or engage in. The decisive step of 
innovation then is interpreting these observations and concluding that one’s own innovation is worth 
the effort. That is the entrepreneur’s venture (that will in turn be observed by others and may lead them 
to engage in ventures of their own). 
To be even more clear: “working with probabilities is not supposed to eliminate uncertainty, but to 
make it manageable by systematically creating additional possibilities” (Esposito, 2007, p. 94). 
Reflecting what appears to be realizable by thinking it in terms of probability generates new 
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possibilities that were not probable at all in the beginning, but can powerfully emerge in the process of 
reasoning and decision-making because one observes that no one else sees or even pursues them so far. 
Only in sounding out alternatives to gauge the probability of their realization, other possibilities (= 
unexpected alternatives) come into play that previously either seemed impossible or had simply not 
been thought of at all. Innovation is born from a tense situation of uncertain alternatives in view of a 
new certainty that remains utterly opaque and uncertain to anyone else. 
Only then does the voluntaristic act begin: the innovator is now certain of knowing something no one 
else knows. From the uncertainty of the others springs his certainty, even though it is merely imagined 
at first. The difference is crucial, though: it leads to a kind of “exploitation of (the others’) ignorance” 
(cf. Shackle, 1972, p. 98, p. 158). The rest is enthusiasm, effort and conviction. 
Above all, the “reality of the investment” is an event to which more and other circumstances contribute 
than the entrepreneurial investor’s idealistic voluntarism. The heroizing notion of an investor realizing 
his idea all by himself is false insofar as in the end there have to be buyers who in fact want the 
products created through the investment. Only the market ultimately approves the investment, and the 
market is nothing but the buyers and demanders who have to be just as convinced of the investment (or 
the resulting product) as the investor himself had been in the beginning. 
Thus every investment is a rhetoric that must convince others to deem relevant what the investor 
imagined to be relevant: in the pragmatic sense of that relevance being approved through payments. No 
investment is self-explanatory. What is being invested in (a new product or a modification/expansion of 
an older one) must be communicable in such a way that it can be approved by the market. In this sense 
an investment can only be consummated when it succeeds in creating interactions that confirm the 
imagined revenue expectations through payments. Only then does the cycle of investment and 
expectations complete itself. 
There is another peculiarity to the fact that entrepreneurs do not decide solo, but in a market context: 
the entrepreneur assumes others will value the thing he is investing in just as highly as he does. But his 
entrepreneurial decision creates new uncertainty. “A world in which people make decisions does not 
only have an uncertain future depending on decisions made in the present. Uncertainty in this world 
also multiplies by the number of decision-makers. Each of these persons bases their decisions on other 
people’s decisions and their consequences. And because, naturally, all of them do this, the result is a 
dizzying multiplication of uncertainty” (Esposito, 2007, p. 51f.). 
As the entrepreneur does not know how others assess his decision (or how they factor it in when 
making their own decisions), his attempt of measuring probabilities is potentially uncertain, because his 
decisions influence those of the others—positively, he hopes. But that will always be contingent, for, at 
the same time, others make entrepreneurial decisions that are also being observed by others and 
influence their decision-making. One cannot say which influence will dominate in the end, and one 
cannot predetermine the outcome through a single entrepreneurial decision. Entrepreneurs must learn to 
deal with this paradox: on the one hand, they put their reputation at risk by making bold decisions, on 
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the other, they have an aversion to the risks others would take. And if everything fails, they can even be 
called out as cheats. Their virtue lies in confidently handling this paradox (Immerthal, 2007, p. 382). 
Time has a part in all this as well. The investment decisions made in the present and in view of the 
future are based on present expectations. As time passes, however, the others’ assessments may change, 
forcing the entrepreneur to adapt his original expectations. However, he cannot revise the decision itself 
(the consequences of an investment decision made at t1 must be accepted at t2). 
Consequently, one would have had to factor in this contingency when making the decision; that is a 
problem, though, as that same contingency would have jeopardized the decision in the first place. 
Entrepreneurs show a different reaction: they increase their efforts to follow through with their idea, 
especially with regard to their own conviction that is supposed to convince others, too. They revise 
their original plans during the investment process by observing the others observing them. Investments 
are processes; the primary decision to invest determines the direction, but changes made can still be 
made along the way. This is a period of heightened awareness, necessary for the success of the intended 
realization: entrepreneurial awareness. 
The desire to see their own investment succeed, although others might assess it differently than they 
would like to imagine, forces entrepreneurs to try and convince those others every bit as much as they 
themselves are convinced. They must get the others’ attention: through marketing, advertisement, etc., 
but also through their personal performance. Advertising is essential: its job is not only to inform the 
world of the introduction of a new product, but also to persuade potential demanders that they need this 
product in their life, that it will positively influence their life-style, that it will help them distinguish 
themselves from other consumers, gain status, etc. Advertisement is the modern attention arena 
entrepreneurs need, especially when they introduce something new to the market. Their products are 
products and semantics (and semiotics) (Priddat, 2004, 2007). Investing in products must be 
supplemented by investing in conviction, and that can only succeed when the investment is in tune with 
a certain life-style. The degree of innovativeness then depends on whether the product matches an 
existing life-style or creates a new one. Entrepreneurs are the protagonists in an economics of 
persuasion. 
Advertisement does not persuade potential customers directly (or only in rare cases); it rather produces 
a resonance space that prepares a sensory and cognitive opening for the new product, thus rendering it 
potentially compatible. 
Basically, entrepreneurs have to live with the expectation of a high level of frustration, but they just 
block it out. As entrepreneurs they act as if their investment decision was convincing others sui generis. 
They operate in an extremely voluntaristic manner. If they constantly included the option of failure in 
their reasoning, they would hardly be able to muster the energy necessary for the realization of their 
ideas. They are masters of blinding out and suppressing; notorious optimists, because they are 
notoriously ignorant. Enthusiasm is their basic attitude; they operate in a particular mood, in emotional 
emergence of transgressive observance (cf. Loehr, 2010, “the higher the obstacles, the higher the 
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motivation to overcome them”, p. 29). 
 
4. Innovation in Context 
Entrepreneurship is characterized to some degree by nonconformism, by acting differently from what 
others would expect you to. Seen from the outside, this may sometimes seem “slightly crazy”, and it 
actually is craziness with regard to the sphere of conformity. This is why most people only ever tell 
success stories. Whoever dares to engage in such a venture operates with the nimbus of the experienced 
player who knows “what the market wants”. Only like this can others acknowledge that someone 
apparently acting “slightly crazy” is doing the right thing: they assume he has an experience they lack, 
and therefore they believe him to also have a kind of discernment they lack. At the same time, however, 
the entrepreneur’s passion creates an enthusiastic atmosphere that takes hold of the others (something 
that an intercultural comparison will more easily find with Americans than with Europeans); an 
autopoietic process with positive, affirmative repercussions for the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial action 
creates interference (and catches on to management, the employee variety of company leadership (cf. 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007)). 
Entrepreneurs only prove to be successful competitors when they act as innovators, as Schumpeter tells 
us. Innovations are not inventions; they are the entrepreneurial implementation of inventions. It is once 
again the idealist/pragmatic model we find here (much like Foucault’s conception of man as 
empirico-transcendental doublet): only ideas that seem realizable are taken up. This, too, seems trivial: 
but what is realizable? 
Most innovations are variations of the already known; only few things are really new. Harrison C. 
White sees entrepreneurs as parts of producer networks that mutually observe each other and primarily 
coordinate their actions by way of this observation (White, 1981, 2004): mimesis instead of 
inventio/innovatio. Most of the things they “innovate” are different versions of something that already 
existed. Very rarely do they venture further away from what has already been introduced to the markets. 
They work on follow-up opportunities. Like a swarm of fish they follow the innovative herring, until 
no more surplus profit can be had from imitating his innovation. Competition is, above all, a 
competition of imitation (competing in the fields of cost, quality, sales, marketing, etc.). By acting this 
way, they seek to eliminate the fundamental uncertainty of whether a new product will actually catch 
on. They work with “second hand innovations” whose social and market relevance have long been 
confirmed. This is more about nuances and small differences, more about arbitrage then about 
innovation. 
Innovative investments, on the other hand, are more daring (if the comparative is appropriate here). 
They take on the more fundamental uncertainty of the truly “innovative innovation”. They do not know 
whether what they imagine to be new and profitable will be communicated on the market. They are 
taking a risk without probability. 
They achieve transformation: in itself and for the consumers. Not only has the entrepreneur’s 
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investment paid off when something new catches on, but the consumers’ world is richer for it, too. To 
the extent the customers accept the innovation as a part of their lives, it is transformative: it changes the 
customers’ world and therefore the customers themselves with regard to this world. The innovator’s 
efforts of persuasion (= advertising) are efforts to pull the potential buyer into the sphere of his, the 
innovator’s, own imagination. In modern societies, we have grown so used to this fact that we no 
longer see anything unusual in it. To the contrary, we keep expecting innovations (in a hyperrealm of 
conventionality that makes up the firm ground on which we are even able to cope with the new). 
The new stands for the dynamics of our world. In a traditional sense, we do not need it, but in a modern 
one we depend on those surprises. Because we no longer live in thoroughly structured worlds with 
clearly defined social roles, we, as partially defined individuals, constantly depend on compensation 
and redefine us through whatever new things we are being offered in order to rearrange our lives. The 
incomplete self is than constantly being (approximately) completed by new things, only to instantly 
feel the next deficit that can apparently only be balanced by another new thing, and so forth. In modern 
economic jargon, we have relatively indeterminate relational contracts with the world that we keep 
trying to close by taking on something new. Our self is constantly busy with re-contracting; less so with 
greater age, but in no way predetermined or structured. Whatever we adopt for compensatory purposes 
keeps transforming us to new states of expectation (cf. Bröckling, 2007). 
In this sense, the entrepreneurs’ venture of investing in something new (= innovation) is no heroic act 
of positioning themselves in the world, but something that is to a large degree socially expected. There 
is a high level of readiness for the new, almost to the extent of being a demand, that entrepreneurs 
deliver on (it even seems risky not to be innovative). The conclusiveness of innovative 
entrepreneurship and the expectations of modern societies put entrepreneurial heroism into perspective. 
It rather calls for a new form of social intelligence on the part of the entrepreneurs engaging in a 
competition of innovativeness. It is no longer only about the entrepreneurs’ mutual observation, as 
White holds: “markets are specific groups of producer who mutually observe one another. Increasing 
demand creates a kind of mirror in which the producers, not the consumers, see themselves” (White, 
1981, p. 543). When implementing a new idea (the actual business of innovation), the entrepreneur 
must be better than others in assessing which complement world to cater to. On the background of the 
modern self’s indetermination, the question becomes how to construct matching determinations to help 
those selves complete themselves: it’s about life-style design. Or, in opposition to White, about 
observing consumers and their worlds. 
New things make people reevaluate the old ones. Only now do they realize the old is in fact old. The 
world’s relations regroup (as small as the innovation may be, it still throws a different light on what we 
knew before). In face of the new, the modern self experiences itself as new, i.e., as supplemented with 
something it seemed to lack before (life enrichment). It can reposition itself socially (with a new 
product, a new way of eating, a new and lifestyle-compatible outfit, participation in a health movement, 
adventure events, ecological performance, etc.). Lars Immerthal calls the modern entrepreneur a 
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parasite (à la Michel Serres), who disrupts the usual relations of exchange, who creates new 
indeterminations by balancing old ones (Immerthal, 2007, Chap. 10; referring to Michel Serres, 1987). 
Entrepreneurs are dynamic attractors of modern societies, not only of markets (or themselves). They 
provide life-styles to an extent we are not conscious of anymore, because we don’t know the historic 
differences anymore: the conventionality and culturality of previous life-styles. This is not cultural 
criticism, but a systematic remark. In spite of the latent anti-capitalism in our society, the entrepreneur 
is destined to enjoy a kind of cult status when he acts innovatively. It is not his achievement of offering 
jobs and salaries that people acknowledge (those are traditional values), but his efforts for culturation: 
innovations that are no longer only technological advancements but also include the life-style implied 
by those technologies and sold together with them (cf. Priddat, 2007). Education, family, class or social 
strata are less important than the life-styles offered in the “consumist revolution” (cf. Bolz, 2002) that 
introduce new social differences, particularly those between individuals (life-style classes and networks 
impregnated by cultural differences). Innovative entrepreneurs are the motors of culture in dynamic 
societies. 
The ironic part is that entrepreneurs do not see themselves that way: they value their business acumen 
much higher than their cultural one. Taking this specific underperformance into account, they are the 
cultural subconscious of modern societies: effective, but nonreflective. They completely lack any 
avant-garde consciousness: the only way to flatter them is praising their business skills. They provide 
the designs of modern life-styles with businesslike intuition and also cope with these paradoxes. 
The cultural development of the 21
st
 century will be marked by entrepreneurs more than ever before. 
Let’s wait and see, until types of entrepreneurs emerge who balance out business and cultural 
conscience and force along the potential for irritation of cultural development. Following Franz Liebl, 
Dirk Baecker calls this “cultural hacking” (Düllo/Liebl, 2005): Irritation here primarily means the 
venture of creating new codes and making them count within the old ones. For Dirk Baecker, cultural 
work is either a form of programming and execution of codes, or a kind of hacking that displaces the 
codes and plays around with them in order to point out and correct gaps (Immerthal, 2007, p. 275; 
referring to Baecker, 2001, p. 75). 
A distinction between different types of innovative entrepreneurs arises: there are those who observe 
other entrepreneurs to find out what innovations they generate, and those who observe consumers to 
find out what worlds they accept. The second type is a cultural entrepreneur, and he knows it when 
doing business. We would do well to pay more attention to this phenomenon. 
1) The investor realizes his idea with all his might, a lot of energy and motivation, by manipulating the 
mental state of potential demanders: he changes their frame, their preferences, and their desires. He 
convinces them to see the world a little different than before. The knowledge unfolding in his idea is not 
knowledge about what people want, but the (rhetorical) knowledge that he is able to persuade them, i.e. 
to make them know what they then believe they actually did know. This is a form of rhetoric 
traditionally belonging to politics. It is, rhetorically, a power play (competing with others to convince 
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the majority). The future in which the investment is supposed to bear fruit has nothing to do with 
waiting for the event to occur, but with creating the event by creating expectability = promises for the 
potential customers. The investor/innovator produces expectations his products meet. 
2) The economic description that sees the investor as waiting for an event is therefore flawed. He 
creates the event. The possibility of failure is just as much a part of the game as success. This is not 
about betting and chances, but about energetic action, a form of expressive rationality generating a new 
knowledge through the coherence of the product rhetoric and the expectations that recipients/customers 
have developed. Only when they buy, when the payout is realized, can one understand what happened 
before. Up to that point, it was political rhetoric, i.e., “persuasive speech” (Protagoras) competing with 
other potential sellers, to take up the classical metaphor.  
3) The investor does not believe in the system but disrupts it; he breaks into its mechanisms by 
changing the mental state, the belief of market actors. 
4) The ignorance into which he ventures with his ideas is no opaque terrain to be scouted and 
illuminated before a decision can be made (although there is a whole industry, market research, 
continuously trying to do just this, up to the new form of prediction markets in which the market 
principle reproduces itself inside the prediction). The economic process works differently: it is, as 
economic activity, a political rhetoric of change of belief regarding the relevance of alternatives the 
demanders constantly have to choose from, because hypermodern markets offer an enormous and also 
dynamic differentiation in the choice of products. Investors do not care about what people want 
(nobody can know that anyway, above all because people themselves do not know what they want and 
can want), but about pragmatic variations of the choice of products, paired with convincing rhetoric, 
that is not only based on advertising but on the products themselves (Like Apple’s iPod and iPad: 
similar products had long been available from competitors, but Apple managed to include a life-style 
esthetics in the package that was more than just a useful device. That was the crucial momentum). Like 
the potential customer, the investor is an animal poeta, and economics is an economics of persuasion. 
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